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CURRENT LEGISLATION
vision of the will, for under the revised statute all residuary property
will be subject to all general legacies in the will, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided.
In its final result, the statutory change has substituted a rule of
law for an unwieldy group of decisions attempting to gve equitable
justice in the interpretation of wills as to the testator's intent in the
payment of general legacies and distribution of real property not
specifically devised.
JoHN P. MAHON.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIM AcT-A FURTHER WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY.-Congress recognizing the need for a more efficient and
just method of settling private tort claims brought by any citizen
against the United States arising out of the negligence or wrongful
acts of any employee, while carrying out his duties of employment or
office, passed Public Law No. 601 of the 79th Congress known as
the "Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946" of which Title IV is
known as the "Federal Tort Claim Act." I Now, the United States
Government can be sued without the claimant first obtaining consent;
in effect the Federal Government has waived its sovereign immunity
in regard to claims arising out of causes as outlined in the Act.
Formerly, since the Government very rarely consented to be
sued,2 the only method of redress for negligent injury in a case, for
example, of negligent operation of a motor vehicle was for the claim-
ant to get a judgment against the driver of the Government vehicle,
which was usually uncollectible due to the financial status of the em-
ployee. The judgment was then presented to the Congressional
Claims Committee in order to have a private claims bill passed. Such
a bill had to be introduced in Congress by a member, asking for an
appropriation of a sum of money to be paid to the beneficiary of this
private bill as compensation for the loss he had suffered. However,
the percentage of these private bills that were passed in comparison to
the number introduced was small. These bills in addition to being
a very costly proposition even as far as printing costs alone were
concerned, took up much of the valuable time of Congress.3
The Act as passed concerns itself with common law torts.
Under the terms of the Act the principal tort for which the Gov-
ernment waives its sovereign immunity and allows itself to be sued
now as a matter of right is that of negligence. There are express
160 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 921 (Supp. 1946).
2 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586, 85 L. ed. 1058, 1061
(1941) ("The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it
consents to be sued.").
3 H. R. Doc. No. 562, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942) ; H. R. Rep. No. 667,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
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exceptions; as to those cases for which there are already remedies
in existence, as well as to those listed in the Act.4
The method of procedure is designed to eliminate unjust delay
with simplicity as its keynote. Where claim is made for $1,000 or
less the agency or department against which the claim is entered
will have the authority to negotiate and settle the same. In cases
where the claim is in excess of $1,000 the claimant must bring his
action against the United States. The suit must be instituted in a
United States District Court. The summons and complaint must
be served on the local United States Attorney, and the claim tried
without a jury before a United States District Court judge. Either
party to the suit has the right to appeal from this decision in ac-
cordance with the existing appellate procedure.5
The statute of limitation under the Act is one year.6 Every
'60 STAT. 845 (1946), 28 U. S. C. §943 (Supp. 1946). The provisions
of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by the Act of March 9,
1920 (U. S. C., title 46, §§ 741-752, inclusive), or the Act of March 3, 1925
(U. S. C., title 46, §§ 781-790, inclusive), relating to claims or suits in
admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the
Government in administering the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, as amended.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of
a quarantine by the United States.
(g) Any claim arising from injury to vessels, or to the cargo, crew, or
passengers of vessels, while passing through the locks of the Panama Canal
or while in Canal Zone waters.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abusive- process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury
or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of. the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
r60 STAT. 844 (1946), 28 U. S. C. §933 (Supp. 1946).
a60 STAT. 845 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 942 (Supp. 1946). Statute of limi-
tations. Every qlaim against the United States cognizable under this title
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claim brought under the Act must be brought within one year after
such claim has accrued or within one year after the date of enact-
ment of the Act, whichever is later. If the claim is for $1,000 or
less and presented to the federal agency out of whose activities it
arises for payment, provision is made for an extension of six months
from date of notification by the agency of disposition of the claim,
or from date of withdrawal of the claim from such federal agency if
it would otherwise expire before the end of such period.
7
Though formerly the United States has never been open to suit
against it in general tort liability, the Government has waived its
immunity in the past in regard to claims arising out of contract.8
Consent was also given under the Admiralty Act,9 which authorized
suits against the United States in admiralty, suits for salvage ser-
vices, and providing for the release of merchant vessels belonging
to the United States from arrest and attachment in foreign juris-
diction and for other purposes.' 0 Other instances of such waiver of
immunity are the Public Vessels Act of 1925,11 and an act author-
izing suit for Government infringement of patents.' 2
The trend today is indicative of a breaking away from the archaic
concept that the king can do no wrong. That we clung to this con-
cept was vividly illustrated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of
The Western Maid, where he said, "... the authority that makes
the law is itself superior to it . . . ,, 's Certainly in modern times
when we have witnessed the Government entering the field of pri-
vate business, through various governmental agencies and depart-
ments, we should not be hindered and handicapped by so cumber-
some a concept of sovereign immunity which has influenced and
permeated our legislation in the past.
Great strength is given to the argument for the extension of
shall be forever barred, unless within one year after such claim accrued or
within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, whichever is later,
it is presented in writing to the federal agency out of whose activities it arises,
if such claim is for a sum not exceeding $1,000; or unless within one year
after such claim accrued or within one year after the date of enactment of
this Act, whichever is later, an action is begun pursuant to part 3 of this title.
In the event that a claim for a sum not exceeding $1,000 is presented to a
federal agency as aforesaid, the time to institute a suit pursuant to part 3 of
this title shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of mailing
of notice to the claimant by such federal agency as to the final disposition of
the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim from such federal
agency pursuant to Section 410 of this title, if it would otherwise expire
before the end of such period.
7 For a sectional analysis of the Act, see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claim Act, 35 Gzo. L. J. 1 (1946).
s24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §41(20) (1940); see
Pound, A Survey of Public Interests, 58 HARV. L. Rrv. 909 (1945).
941 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §741 (1940).
20 United States v. Caffey, 141 F. 2d 69 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
143 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. § 781 (1940).
1236 STAT. 851 (1910), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §68 (1940).
13257 U. S. 419, 432, 66 L. ed. 299, 303 (1921).
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governmental liability by looking to the states, what steps they have
taken and the apparent results. Four states, New York, California,
Arizona and Illinois have extended and waived their governmental
immunity in the field of tort without suffering any unfavorable con-
sequences.' 4 In 1929 by act of the legislature of the State of New
York, the Court of Claims Act was amended, whereby immunity
from liability for torts of officers and employees was waived and lia-
bility assumed.' 5 Under this Act of the State of New York, the City
of New York was liable for personal injuries caused by a runaway
police horse.16
Thus we have seen from our discussion instances where fed-
eral, state and municipal governments have allowed themselves to
be subjected to suits arising out of negligence, manifesting their in-
tent to discard the protection of the aged, outmoded concept of sov-
ereign immunity. (It is wholly within the realm of probability that
charitable institutions will be the next in line to forfeit some of their
immunizing privileges, as New York State has already done in re-
gard to employees in its charitable institutions.)
In the recent case of McCrink v. City of New York,17 decided
in January of this year, Judge Lewis in interpreting Section 8 of the
Court of Claims Act, points out the effect of this state Act upon the
theory of liability of its subordinate sovereign, the city. "The im-
munity thus waived and the consent thus granted apply to the
'... civil divisions of the State [which] are answerable equally with
individuals and private corporations for wrongs of officers and em-
ployees-even if no separate statute sanctions that enlarged liability
in a given instance."' 1 8
It would be interesting to keep in mind for further consideration
this question: Since a municipality has been deemed to have waived
its immunity because the state has, now that the Federal Government
has waived its immunity, will the Act under consideration be con-
strued as a waiver of the immunities of the state governments which
still cling to their archaic insulation from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity? 19
IRVING GERSHANOW,
FRANKLIN MORTON.
14 Laws of N. Y. 1929, c. 467; Cal. Statutes 1893, c. 45, § 1, p. 57; Ariz.
Laws 1912, c. 59; Laws of Ill. 1917, c. 325.
15 Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735 (1933).
Is Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. 2d 604 (1945).
17296 N. Y. 99, 71 N. E. 2d 419 (1947).
is296 N. Y. 99, 106, 71 N. E. 2d 419, 422 (1947).
1 McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N. Y. 99, 71 N. E. 2d 419 (1947).
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